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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2186
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000544

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2017
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [UNSC](#) [UNMIK](#) [YI](#)
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL'S PERMREP ON KOSOVO: SIX MONTHS OF TALKS,
NO AUTOMATICITY

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: In a lunch meeting on June 27, Portuguese Permrep Joao Salgueiro and Ambassador Wolff discussed strategies for achieving supervised independence for Kosovo. Salgueiro expressed reservations about scenarios involving unilateral recognition, was opposed to putting a Security Council resolution on Kosovo to a vote that would end in a veto, and argued for six more months of negotiations without automatic implementation of the Ahtisaari settlement if no deal is reached. End summary.

Options For Dealing With Kosovo Resolution

¶2. (C) In a lunch meeting on June 27, Portuguese Permrep Joao Salgueiro (incoming EU Presidency) and Ambassador Wolff discussed strategies for achieving supervised independence for Kosovo. Salgueiro recounted a recent conversation with Russian Permrep Churkin, who had told him that Russia was working on creative ideas on Kosovo to present when Putin was in Kennebunkport. Salgueiro opined that this claim had not sounded credible to him. He also said that Churkin had argued to him that once Kosovars have independence they could throw out international supervision. Salgueiro said he understood Russia was proposing another year of negotiations. Ambassador Wolff explained that in our discussions with the Russians, they had indicated a desire for a longer period, but had not discussed the matter in detail because it seemed to be secondary to the larger issue. Indeed, the Russian Mission in New York had instructions not to engage at all on such matters.

¶3. (C) Ambassador Wolff reviewed possible alternatives for the Council, including avoiding a resolution altogether and taking national decisions to recognize Kosovo's independence. Salgueiro replied that such an option would be feasible if we could remove the legal obstacle of UNSCR 1244, which he averred that we could not. Ambassador Wolff responded that our legal experts did not agree with this, but the whole question would be moot anyway if the Kosovars decided to declare independence on their own. Salgueiro responded that "our message to the Kosovars should be that the only way to keep your hopes on track is to be quiet until we tell you we can no longer afford for you not to be." Ambassador Wolff explained that this could not be done without some perspective for the future for the people of Kosovo. Salgueiro asserted that, on the subject of a plan B with no resolution, we would still have to keep UNMIK but NATO's role would become unclear. The Kosovars would also not be satisfied with the dubious international status of not having a clear claim on sovereignty. Ambassador Wolff explained that for the Kosovars, the real question was how long they

would allow Serbia and Russia to block their independence.

Six Months of Negotiations Without Automaticity: An 18-year Old Leaving Home

¶4. (C) Salgueiro asserted that for the Serbs, final status was like a de-colonization process and needed to be dealt with properly. He claimed that with proper negotiations, the question of Kosovo's permanent separation from Serbia could be handled. Therefore, Ambassador Wolff responded that we could not ask of the Serbs to do what was impossible for them; many experts had already declared that no political figure in Serbia could agree to independence and we could not expect either Tadic or Kostunica to come out of a negotiation accepting this formally. Salgueiro insisted that we should tell the Kosovars to "give us six more months and we will work for you."

¶5. (C) Ambassador Wolff underscored that the situation in Kosovo was becoming increasingly difficult and the political reality remained that if there were a declaration of independence by the Kosovars then we would be faced with the decision of recognizing or not recognizing. He noted that we were also having discussions with the Serbs in New York and their approach was at least somewhat realistic and focused on how to manage the Kosovo problem, as opposed to Russia's more abstract approach. Salgueiro commented that the Serb Permrep seemed to want to take a helpful approach, but was tightly constrained. He said it was also unclear how exactly the information circle involving Moscow, Belgrade and the Serbian and Russian Missions in New York functioned.

¶6. (C) Comment: While Salgueiro seemed generally familiar with the Kosovo issue, he seemed comfortable with ambiguous

and inconclusive arrangements that would postpone decision-making and final determination of status. We will need to work the Portuguese Presidency to ensure support for our Kosovo decisions. End comment.

WOLFF